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ABSTRACT
This article focuses on the role of government in relation to
cybersecurity. Traditionally, cybersecurity was primarily seen as a
technical issue. In recent years, governments have realised that
they, too, have a stake in securing the Internet. In their attempts
to grapple with cybersecurity, governments often turn to
technical solutions to ‘code away’ illegal or undesired behaviours.
‘Techno-regulation’ has become popular because it may seem to
be an effective and cheap way of increasing control over end
users’ behaviours and increasing cybersecurity. In this article, we
will explain why using techno-regulation has significant
downsides and, therefore, why it may be unwise to use it as a
dominant regulatory strategy for securing the Internet. We argue
that other regulatory strategies ought to be considered as well,
most importantly: trust. The second part of this article explains
that trust can be used as an implicit strategy to increase
cybersecurity or as an explicit mechanism for the same goal.
KEYWORDS
Cybersecurity; techno-
regulation; trust
1. Introduction
Over the past decades, the Internet has become an indispensable element of our social,
professional, and economic lives. Some would even argue that it should be labelled a criti-
cal infrastructure (cf. Latham 2003). The Internet has brought a significant segment of the
world’s population more and better possibilities to connect. It has led to an increase in effi-
ciency in accessing and sharing information. And it has been a boost for global trade, facil-
itating a new online economy and digitising traditional economies. At the same time, it has
become increasingly clear that the Internet can also be used to create harms of many
kinds, ranging from cybercrimes (hacking, identity theft, and other forms of fraud) to
cyber-espionage, cyber-terrorism, and cyber-warfare. Due to the centrality of the Internet
in the global economy and in our personal and professional lives, moreover, the impact of
cybersecurity risks can potentially be very severe. This is why, over the past decade, cyber-
security – keeping the Internet and the networked digital technologies connected to that
network safe and secure – has become an increasingly important topic. But how do we
realise cybersecurity?
© 2017 The Author(s). Published by Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group
This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives License
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/), which permits non-commercial re-use, distribution, and reproduction in any
medium, provided the original work is properly cited, and is not altered, transformed, or built upon in any way.
CONTACT Bibi van den Berg b.van.den.berg@fgga.leidenuniv.nl
INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF LAW, COMPUTERS & TECHNOLOGY, 2017
VOL. 31, NO. 2, 188–205
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13600869.2017.1298504
One of the answers that is often given by governments and regulators is that we can
make the Internet safer and more secure by gaining more control over it. If we can
keep a tighter rein on the behaviours of actors online – be they individuals, communities,
organisations, businesses, or public parties – then this will increase security in cyberspace.
More security is essential, governments argue. Not only does it ensure effective and unin-
terrupted network operations, but it also strengthens users’ trust in the system. This bol-
sters the innovative potential that the Internet offers and will make it flourish even more in
years to come.
In this article, we will look at one of the key strategies that governments and regulators
have embraced in the past decade or so in the name of increasing security in cyberspace.
This strategy is called ‘techno-regulation’: ‘influencing […] individuals’ behaviours by
building legal norms into technological devices’ (Van den Berg and Leenes 2013, 68).
Techno-regulation means that we build barriers into technological artefacts or systems,
so that individuals using them cannot commit undesired or illegal actions anymore. The
key element of techno-regulation is that, by implementing norms and (legal) rules into
technological artefacts, these artefacts become the enforcer of the rule or the norm.
It is easy to see why techno-regulation might be a popular regulatory strategy for gov-
ernments.1 If the technological systems offered only allow end users a clearly circum-
scribed set of actions, and if deviating from that set of actions is made impossible
because systems simply do not offer the possibility to do so, then the level of control
increases. When techno-regulation is deployed to increase security the outcome is easy
to predict: such systems will, in fact, be more secure. There are numerous examples of
cases where techno-regulation is used, both in the offline and in the online world, for a
wide variety of purposes. Increasing security is one of them, and it turns out that this strat-
egy is, in fact, very effective in raising security levels. However, at the same time using
techno-regulation also has significant shortcomings. Over the years, these have been dis-
cussed in various scientific publications (Yeung 2008; Brownsword and Yeung 2008b; Hil-
debrandt 2009; Leenes 2011), and we will touch upon them in this article in Section 3.2 as
well (see below).
The main contribution of this article lies in asking the question that precedes the deploy-
ment of techno-regulation. It takes a critical stance towards the silent assumption that
more cybersecurity must mean more control? Can we not use regulatory strategies to
increase cybersecurity that do not require, or lead to, more control? In our view, the
answer is a wholehearted ‘yes, we can’. Yes, we can make cyberspace more secure, and
yes, we can do this, for instance, by using another interpersonal strategy that we com-
monly use in our everyday, offline lives: trust. In this article, we will show that rather
than viewing control as the only, or even the most important path to cybersecurity, we
should expand our view on the means and ends of securing cyberspace and allow for
other key mechanisms as well.
We will start the article with a brief discussion on cybersecurity: what it is, why it matters
and why governments feel they have a responsibility in (contributing to) cybersecurity.
This is followed by a discussion of techno-regulation, explaining its strengths and weak-
nesses. It is these weaknesses, and the drive for control that leads to increased adoption
of techno-regulatory interventions, that are at the heart of this article. We will argue that
rather than focusing on increased control for cybersecurity, we can also use other mech-
anisms to increase security, most importantly trust. The second part of this article discusses
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what trust is and how we can put it to good use for cybersecurity. We will explain that trust
as a regulatory strategy for a more secure Internet can take different forms: we can use
trust as an implicit strategy, or as an explicit mechanism for improved cybersecurity. We
conclude that reliance on techno-regulation as a dominant strategy for improving cyber-
security has serious shortcomings, and that it is vital that we broaden our views on how to
make the Internet more safe and secure. Using trust as a regulatory strategy could be a
good candidate.
2. Cybersecurity: a very short introduction
For decades, concerns over the security of networked technologies were originally largely
left to the technical community. Under the banner of ‘information security’, research and
development in this area focused predominantly on three domains: protecting the confi-
dentiality of data, keeping the integrity of data safe and secure, and ensuring the avail-
ability of systems, networks, and data (cf. Schneier 2004; Nissenbaum 2005; Hansen and
Nissenbaum 2009; Singer and Friedman 2013; Appazov 2014). Over the years, much pro-
gress has been made on these three topics in the technical sciences.
In recent years, however, researchers and stakeholders outside the technical domain
have started pointing out that to create adequate protection levels for security on/off
the Internet a purely technical focus is too limited. ‘Cybersecurity’ became a novel term
for a much broader understanding of security in relation to the Internet, emphasising
not only the role of technologies and systems themselves, but also those of human
beings that use these systems. Understanding cybersecurity risks, and findings ways to
reduce these to acceptable levels (whatever we define these to be), can, only be done
effectively when both the human and the technological component are taken into con-
sideration (cf. Van den Berg et al. 2014). Cybersecurity issues not only require technical
remedies and solutions, but also demand responses and interventions by governments,
by regulators and policy-makers, by businesses and organisations, and even by end
users themselves. Consequently, many Western countries now consider cybersecurity an
element of their national security strategy (cf. Nissenbaum 2005). These countries have
started developing regulatory mechanisms to improve cybersecurity. But many of them
wonder whether they can, and should, do more. One of the strategies they increasingly
turn to is implementing rules and norms into technical systems, also known as ‘techno-
regulation’ or ‘code as law’ (Lessig 2006).
3. Techno-regulation or ‘code as law’
The foundations for the notion of techno-regulation were developed by Lawrence Lessig
in his landmark book Code 2.0 (Lessig 2006; also see Lessig 1999). In this book, Lessig
pointed out that legal scholars tend to be predisposed to use legal rules as a remedy to
any societal problem they encounter. But there are, in fact, a number of other regulatory
forces that may shape individuals’ actions as well. For example, individuals’ actions may be
influenced by market forces, such as price mechanisms or taxation. Or they may be steered
in their choices and behaviours by social norms. And finally – and most importantly for this
article – Lessig pointed out that individuals behaviours are shaped by architectures (Lessig
2006, 123). This is so in both a literal and a more figurative meaning of the word
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‘architecture’. Architecture as in buildings, the physical organisation of our public and
private spaces, affects what people can and cannot do. We are contained in, and con-
strained by, the shape and size of the spaces we work and live in, or travel through. But
architecture also has a more figurative meaning. Software and hardware also qualify as
forms of architecture: they shape what we can and cannot do when using digital technol-
ogies. They are regulatory forces, steering, guiding and influencing behaviours, and
actions of end users. Lessig (2006) used the terms ‘code as law’ and ‘regulation by
design’ to illustrate the idea that architectures can be used to regulate behaviours of indi-
viduals. Over the years this idea has come to be called ‘techno-regulation’ (Wu 2003; Kesan
and Shah 2006; Brownsword and Yeung 2008a; Kerr 2010; Hildebrandt 2011; Leenes 2011;
Yeung 2011; Van den Berg and Leenes 2013; Van den Berg 2014).
3.1. Limiting and enabling actions through design
Techno-regulation refers to the implementation of (legal) rules or norms into artefacts or
systems, with the goal of shaping, steering, or influencing end user’s actions. Note that
techno-regulation has both a limiting and an enabling function. On the one hand, the
design of software and hardware provides a limited action space for users: they can
only use an artefact or system in the way it was intended by the designers. Other function-
alities or options are simply not open to them (except maybe to a very small minority of
very tech-savvy end users or hackers). In this way, techno-regulation enables designers (or
regulators) to keep end users away from undesired or illegal actions. Such actions are lit-
erally coded away. But techno-regulation does not only offer limitations. Techno-regu-
lation also means that we build specific incentives into artefacts or systems to
encourage users towards desired or desirable actions.
One key characteristic of techno-regulation is that end users are often entirely unaware
of the fact that their actions are being regulated in the first place. Techno-regulation
invokes such implicit, almost automatic responses, that end users do not realise that
their action space is limited by the artefacts’ offerings. Thus, when (legal) rules or norms
are implemented into artefacts or systems, it becomes difficult, if not outright impossible,
to disobey these rules or norms. These artefacts and systems become implicit managers
and enforcers of rules: they automatically, and oftentimes even unconsciously, steer or
guide users’ actions in specific directions – towards preferred (set of) actions and away
from undesirable or inappropriate ones.
3.2. Benefits and drawbacks of using techno-regulation
For regulators, this last point is considered one of the key benefits of using techno-regu-
lation. Using techno-regulation is efficient, easy, and very effective. It leads to very high
levels of compliance. Because disobeying the rule that is implemented into an artefact
or system is (nearly) impossible, techno-regulatory interventions are among some of the
most effective forms of regulation. Moreover, techno-regulation is one of the most cost-
effective ways of regulating. The enforcement of the rule for example is delegated to
the artefact or system, which means there is no need for expensive law enforcement per-
sonnel. And since end users are much less likely to break the rule, costs for enforcement
are expected to be reduced.
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These two benefits play a key role in the increasing popularity of using this regulatory
strategy. This combination is a regulator’s dream: a regulatory strategy that will lead to
substantial, if not complete, compliance at a fraction of the cost of many other types of
regulatory interventions, including but not limited to laws that need enforcement or
norms that do not have the same level of effectiveness. What’s more, when regulators
push for the use of techno-regulation on the Internet, for example, to increase security,
in the process this automatically leads to significantly more control: more end users will
‘colour within the lines’ thus leading to a higher sense of command over the safe and
secure use of cyberspace.
Having said that, over the years, several lines of critique have been launched against the
use of techno-regulation. For one, this form of regulation is incredibly opaque (cf. Leenes
2011; Yeung 2011). When rules and norms get implemented into a technological artefact
often end users who are confronted with such a device are not aware of the fact that they
are being regulated. Sometimes instances of techno-regulation can be labelled as illegiti-
mate, precisely because end users do not know if, and when, they are being regulated (cf.
Yeung 2011). Under the rule of law, transparency and accountability are key values to
uphold for governments when they seek to regulate the behaviours of citizens. Citizens
need to know under which rule (laws, standards, institutional frameworks) they live and
need to be able to hold government accountable for the proper implementation of
laws and law enforcement that government executes on their behalf. When techno-regu-
latory interventions take place outside the awareness of citizens, the requirement of trans-
parency is not met. Moreover, techno-regulation runs the risk of being undemocratic (cf.
Benoliel 2004). If end users do not know that their actions are regulated by specific archi-
tectures, they have no possibility to question, appeal or object to this.
Despite these reservations, techno-regulation is an increasingly popular regulatory
strategy for both public and private parties on the Internet. Why is this the case? We
explain the rising popularity of techno-regulation by pointing to an underlying assump-
tion. When techno-regulation is deployed on the Internet, especially to increase cyberse-
curity, regulators assume that when end users have less room for manoeuvring, there will
be less risks to security. If end users ‘cannot be bad’ anymore, cybersecurity increases.
Deploying techno-regulatory interventions entails that the regulator increases the level
of control, because the action space of regulatees is more clearly defined and has sharp
boundaries. Hence, when using techno-regulation regulators may, to borrow an idiom,
strike two birds with one stone: it makes the Internet more secure, and it increases the
level of control. Especially for an environment that is so valuable yet also appears to be
so ‘untameable’ as cyberspace, reaching these dual goals through a single type of inter-
vention may be very alluring for governments.
The question we need to ask ourselves, though, is: Is there really a relationship between
control over the Internet and cybersecurity, and what role does techno-regulation play in
this? Does an increase in control over the Internet, brought about by using techno-regu-
lation, make the Internet a safer place?
4. More control equals more (cyber)security?
Answering that question is difficult for several reasons. First, there is the issue of how we
would qualify ‘making the Internet a safer place’. For whom would the Internet become
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safer? And at what price? As we have seen there are significant drawbacks to using techno-
regulation. End users carry the burden of the costs, while regulators (both from private and
public parties) stand to gain: more efficiency and effectiveness, more compliance, a cheap
implementation, and so on.
Second, it is debatable whether techno-regulatory interventions target the right audi-
ence if they are designed to increase cybersecurity. As we have seen, it is likely that
techno-regulatory interventions lead to high levels of compliance, since end users will
almost always automatically follow the implemented rule or norm. Hence, fewer end
users will engage in ‘risky behaviours’, whatever these may be in a given context. While
it is true that techno-regulation may prevent end users from making mistakes that can
have a negative effect on their own cybersecurity or that of others, using this strategy
will not weed out the biggest threat to security: that of intentional attackers. Hackers,
cybercriminals, and those who engage in acts of cyber-espionage or cyber-terrorism go
to great lengths to find weaknesses in systems and services and to exploit these to
their benefit. Currently, the risks posed by these intentional attackers are considered to
be far greater (both in terms of probability of occurrence and in terms of impact) than
those created by genuine errors that random end users will make. Techno-regulatory inter-
ventions, or more generally the idea that a system’s design will delineate the action space
of end users, have no effect on those who intentionally seek to exploit vulnerabilities in it.
This argument casts severe doubts on the assumption that more control (through techno-
regulation) will also lead to more cybersecurity.
While techno-regulation as a strategy has clear and admitted benefits, we argue that the
increasing tendency to seek to ‘solve’ cyber risks through techno-regulation is in need of
reconsideration. Should we not also look at other strategies as well? In the rest of this
article, we will contrast techno-regulation with another regulatory strategy, which up until
this point in time has received little attention in the field of cybersecurity: using trust.
5. An alternative on the horizon: trust
Without some basic sense of trust, we would not be able to get up in the morning. Over-
whelmed by just thinking about all the possible turns fate might take, we would not dare
to leave the warm safety of our beds. Trust is a strategy to deal with the complexities
inherent in life. The fact that, to a certain extent, we are aware of the unpredictable char-
acter of the future and that we cannot foresee all the actions of others make that we need
trust to set aside some of these uncertainties. To trust is to act as if we know for certain
what tomorrow will bring, while in fact we are groping in the dark.
Although most people intuitively have some ideas on what trust is, this concept cannot
be pinned down easily. In their review article, Seppanen, Blomqvist, and Sundqvist (2007)
counted more than 70 different definitions of trust and this was only in the domain of
inter-organizational trust. As Simon (2013, 1) rightly concludes: ‘As pervasive trust
appears as a phenomenon, as elusive it seems as a concept’.
5.1. What is trust?
While it is not feasible to provide an all-encompassing definition of trust, there are some
characteristics that reoccur in inter-disciplinary scholarly discussions on trust. A proposed
INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF LAW, COMPUTERS & TECHNOLOGY 193
starting point is that trust is closely connected to having positive expectations about the
actions of others. When we trust someone, we assume that the other will not act opportu-
nistically but take into account our interests (e.g. see the encapsulated-trust account of
Hardin 2006). This also entails that when we speak of trust there must be at least two
actors, often referred to as a trustor (who vests trust) and a trustee (who receives trust).
The trustor and trustee do not interact in a vacuum. Trust is contextual in the sense that
certain – often implicit – societal roles, institutions, norms, and values guide the expec-
tations of actors involved. The notion of expectations assumes that the trustor is not com-
pletely sure of the actions of the trustee. The trustor does not possess all the information or
does not have full control to determine the outcome of a certain event. Moreover, the
trustor depends on the trustee and the trustee has the possibility to act in a way that
was not expected by the trustor. To speak of trust, the trustee, therefore, has to have
some kind of agency. In addition, for the trustor there has to be something at stake.
Trust consists of at least three components: The trustor (A) trusts the trustee (B) to do
something (X) (Hardin 2001, 2006). If the actions of the trustee do not make a difference
to the position of the trustor, that is, if the trustor is not affected by the performance of the
trustee, we cannot meaningfully speak of trust. Trust is inextricably connected to vulner-
ability (also see Baier 1986). The trustee may betray the trustor, who as a consequence runs
the risk of getting hurt – physically, mentally, or otherwise. Vesting trust in another person
is a risky business (Luhmann 1979).
Traditionally, trust is located in interpersonal relations and interactions (Good 1988;
McLeod 2014). However, increasingly, due to – amongst others – a wide range of societal
and technological developments, trust is not only being placed in persons but in systems
as well, which is referred to as system trust or confidence (Luhmann 1979, 1988; Giddens
1990, 1991; Giddens and Pierson 1998). Recently, there also has been an increased interest
in trust in and on the Internet – referred to as e-trust (cf. Lahno and Matzat 2004; Taddeo
2010; Taddeo and Floridi 2011; Keymolen 2016) and trust in Artificial Intelligence and
robots (cf. Taddeo 2011; Coeckelbergh 2012). This trust in and through (technological)
systems, such as the Internet, leads to inquiries in the specific shape trust takes because of
the mediating workings of the technologies at hand. Focusing on the Internet, some scholars
argue that interpersonal trust is nearly impossible online (cf. Pettit 2004). However, generally, it
is concluded that trust is ‘translated’ in an online context by developing trust tools such as
reputation schemes and other actor-identifying measures (de Laat 2005; Simpson 2011).
5.2. The function of trust
In order to be able to investigate if and how trust might be of value for regulating the
cyber domain, we have to focus on the functionality of trust. Which problems trust
solves that could be fruitful for cybersecurity measures as well?
Luhmann (1979, 1988) defines the function of trust as a strategy to reduce complexity.
This complexity resides in the fact that, as human beings, we have to deal with uncertainty
and the unpredictable actions of all other human beings with whom we share our world.
As we often do not have full information at hand and cannot be sure about what tomor-
row brings, trust is a ‘blending of knowledge and ignorance’ (Luhmann 1979, 25); it is
acting as if the future is certain. Although we do not know for certain, we assume that
an anticipated future will become reality based on the assumption that other actors will
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act in a stable and predictable way. Trust, therefore, is not about diminishing uncertainty,
but about accepting it. When trust is set in motion, vulnerabilities and uncertainties are not
removed; they are suspended (Möllering 2006, 6). We could say that trust is a very pro-
ductive fiction because ‘certain dangers which cannot be removed but which should
not disrupt action are neutralized’ by it (Luhmann 1979, 25).
As a complexity-reducing strategy, trust is a very useful way to cope with the uncertain-
ties of everyday life. For example, in economics, trust is generally recognised as an impor-
tant mechanism to reduce transactional costs. Since people have to operate in situations
characterised by uncertainty that may negatively impact their willingness to interact,
investments have to be made in all sorts of safeguards and controls to reduce this uncer-
tainty and to facilitate interaction. However, when there is (mutual) trust, this uncertainty is
neutralised and risk management measures and costs of address damaging, opportunistic
or hostile behaviour can be avoided (cf. Möllering 2006, 26–29).
Trust has also been seen as an important prerequisite for innovation practices (cf. Noo-
teboom 2013). Because innovation is inherently uncertain, it is more difficult to rely on
complexity-reducing mechanisms such as contracts, which are focused on determining
the process. Trust, however, is about holding positive expectations about the outcome
without too much control over the course of action. Trust, therefore, is specifically
needed in innovation processes where the process benefits from openness and the
results are uncertain. Moreover, when it comes to adopting new goods or services trust
is acknowledged as an important feature (McKnight and Chervany 2002; McKnight,
Choudhury, and Kacmar 2002; Warkentin et al. 2002; Keymolen, Prins, and Raab 2012).
Without some trust in the functioning of a good or a service, it becomes less likely that
customers will move to purchase.
In summary, trust is valued as a fruitful strategy to cope with uncertainty because,
amongst others, trusting actors can keep transactional costs low, foster innovation, and
feel confident enough to adopt new services and goods.
5.3. The limits of trust
For trust to be a very fruitful and robust strategy in dealing with the uncertainties of every-
day life, its limitations should not be underestimated. First, trust is never the sole strategy
at work to reduce complexity. Rather, we should think of an amalgam of interdependent
strategies that are used to reduce complexity. Tamanaha (2007), for example, explains how
the rule of law enhances certainty, predictability, and security between citizens and gov-
ernment (vertical) and among citizens themselves (horizontal). The existence of rules and
the fact that citizens know there is a safety net in the form of a legal system fosters trust.
Möllering (2006, 111) explains how trust ‘is an ongoing process of building on reason,
routine, and reflexivity’. Estimating chances, relying on roles and norms in society, and
step-by step building confidence in interactions provide meaningful grounds for the sus-
pension of uncertainties characteristic for trust. Luhmann (1979) states that trust can only
take place in a familiar world, an environment that is already known by its inhabitants to a
certain extent. A world is familiar when shared norms and values are present; when people
assume that others perceive the world in a similar way and certain aspects of everyday life
are taken for granted. We can conclude that trust can be the dominant strategy to reduce
complexity; but it is never the sole strategy.
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Second, trust is not the preferred dominant strategy to reduce complexity in all situ-
ations. When it is of the utmost importance that a certain goal be reached or a, particularly,
protocol be followed, other strategies may be more appropriate. For example, although
trust is an important aspect in securing a nuclear plant, it is not the dominant strategy.
Using control mechanisms such as security protocols that one cannot circumvent, or
using security badges and biometric logging systems that control the access to different
parts of the plant are better strategies to reduce the risks associated with a nuclear instal-
lation. To a certain extent, there still should be trust vested in the employees to follow the
rules and in the technological systems in place. However, trust is not the dominant strat-
egy in regulating the functioning of the nuclear plant.
6. Trust as a goal of cybersecurity
Trust is a fruitful strategy to deal with uncertainties. However, it is generally not recognised
as an adequate regulatory strategy for cybersecurity. ‘Trust is good, security is better’, or so
the saying goes (Keymolen, Corien, and Raab 2012, 24). Cybersecurity tends to focus on
implementing rules and norms into systems to ensure the integrity of the communication
and the stable functioning of the infrastructure. Rather than neutralising certain dangers,
much work in the field of cybersecurity is focused on removing them. Although it is widely
accepted by technicians and regulators alike that 100% security does not exist (Chandler
2009, 126–127; Singer and Friedman 2013, 70; Zedner 2003, 159), there still appears to be a
tacit intention to come as close as possible to that goal. Consequently, in the relation
‘trust-cybersecurity’, security is seen as a necessary condition for trust but trust is not con-
sidered as part of cybersecurity. Security measures are put in place to enable a familiar
world, necessary for trust to thrive. The Internet should have a taken-for-granted character
to its users. To put it differently:
If users had to decide every time they use an online service or make use of an application on
their smartphone, whether or not to trust the underpinning infrastructure of the Internet, the
costs would simply become too high. People would be overwhelmed by the uncertainty of
such a complex and unstable environment and probably reject it as a valuable means of inter-
action. For trust to take place on the interpersonal level – or between a user and an organiz-
ation –, the environment, whether or not online, should be familiar first, that is, stable and
predictable. (Keymolen 2016, 108)
We also see this ‘trust as a goal of cybersecurity perspective’ reﬂected in policy documents (cf.
Broeders 2015). For example, theDutchNationalCyber SecurityAgenda (NSCA) states that it is
an explicit goal of cybersecurity to ensure a stable infrastructure to foster trust of users:
[W]e cannot afford to let cyber criminals erode the trust we have – and need to have in the ICT
infrastructure and the services it provides. Trust is a conditio sine qua non for normal econ-
omic transactions and inter-human communication. It is at the core of social order and econ-
omic prosperity, and in an increasingly ICT-dependent world, the security of ICT plays an ever
more important role here (National Cyber Security Research Agenda II: 6–7)
In the academic literature, Nissenbaum (2001) has coined the perspective described
above as ‘trust through security’. She also recognises the strong emphasis on computer
security as a means through which trust online can be established. Nissenbaum discerns
three security mechanisms put in place to ensure trust online: access control, transparency
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of identity, and surveillance. The first refers to passwords, firewalls, and other measures to
ensure that only those actors who are allowed to enter – clients, citizens, members – do
enter and those who are not allowed –hackers, spies, criminals – are blocked. The second
mechanism is about making actors more identifiable. Even if a user does not willingly
provide personal data, all sorts of cryptographic and profiling techniques are used to auth-
enticate users. The basic idea is that if your identity is known you will think twice before
acting malicious, as you can be held accountable for your deeds. The third mechanism is
based on the idea that monitoring actions and behaviour online can prevent bad things
from happening or at least could help to quickly and easily find the wrongdoers.
Nissenbaum is not against security. It is conspicuously clear that for specific online
activities such as banking or e-commerce, high security is necessary. However, Nissen-
baum (2004) warns against the seemingly self-evident move to strive for more security
in all online domains and practices as it may endanger trust and the worthwhile practices
trust facilitates. Reducing complexity and uncertainties should never become a permit to
strive for overall security in a way that it narrows down freedom, which is nurtured by trust
to develop (amongst others) innovative, creative, or political practices. She states:
In a world that is complex and rich, the price of safety and certainty is limitation. Online as off,
[…] the cost of surety – certainty and security – is freedom and wide-ranging opportunity.
(Nissenbaum 2004, 173–174)
7. Trust as an implicit part of a cybersecurity strategy
It is beyond doubt that trust is an important goal for cybersecurity. However, often under
the radar, trust is also part of cybersecurity measures. Trust may be not the dominant strat-
egy, but it certainly contributes to cybersecurity as a supporting, complexity-reducing
strategy. In current regulatory strategies for cybersecurity, we discern at least three
points where trust in fact plays a significant role: trust in human actors, trust in the func-
tioning of technical systems, and trust as an attribute of risk assessment.
7.1. Trust in human actors
When taking a holistic approach in cyber security risk assessments (also see Section 2), not
only the environmental and technical (hardware, software) aspects are considered. Human
factors – defenders, users, and attackers – become part of the analysis as well. Including
human factors in the risk assessment entails anticipating that certain expectations
about human behaviour may not be fulfilled. Whereas in risk assessments it is a given
that attackers act in unforeseen ways, it is sometimes overlooked that this also applies
to defenders and users. They too may behave in deviant ways. For instance: defenders
may circumvent protocols and users may be unable to detect risky situations due to infor-
mation asymmetry. Notwithstanding their sometimes-precarious behaviour, defenders
and users are expected to take on certain cybersecurity tasks and follow guidelines. For
instance, defenders are supposed to have situational awareness and to be able to
report and/or react to the information gathered; users are expected to take care of their
passwords and other credentials to secure their interactions online.
The human actor in cybersecurity strategies, therefore, confronts regulators with a pro-
found challenge: on the one hand, human actors with their specific roles and tasks are part
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of the cybersecurity measures; on the other hand, their actions can only be steered and
controlled by cybersecurity measures. To put it differently, in cybersecurity, defenders
and users are both risk and security enabler.
Trust helps reconcile these conflicting roles. In the end, when cybersecurity assess-
ments are developed and carried out, human actors are trusted to display certain behav-
ioural responses based on which appropriate measures will be taken. Recently, Henshel
et al. (2015) have taken a first step to make this implicit trust in human actors more tan-
gible by developing a model that can be used to assess the trustworthiness of the human
actors in cybersecurity.2 Also from a policy perspective, the awareness grows that a mere
cybersecurity strategy is not enough. Trust between the actors – often distributed over the
public–private sphere – who have to put these strategies into practice is crucial as well
(Heuvel and Baltink 2014).
7.2. Trust in systems
Techno-regulation is, as we have seen, an important regulatory strategy in the cybersecur-
ity domain. Generally, the assumption is that inscribing rules into technology leads to high
levels of compliance and thus is a very effective form of regulation.
While it is obviously true that technological control mechanisms such as cryptography,
logging, and surveillance reduce complexity in the cybersecurity domain, we should not
be blind for the new complexity these technologies at the same time also cause. First,
where information and communication technology (ICT) systems generally are designed
in such a way that they are easy to use, this does not necessarily imply they are also easy
to understand (Keymolen 2016, 152). If defenders have no alternativemeans at their disposal
to check if what the computer tells them is true; when they simply have to rely on the results
the system displays. The system becomes what van den Hoven (1998) has coined an ‘artifi-
cial authority’ in which users have to put their trust. The fact that technology increasingly
functions as a black box, increases dependence on system trust or confidence in systems
(Luhmann 1988; Jalava 2003; Henshel et al. 2015). Second, as these systems themselves
are often too complex to be completely understood, users not only have to trust the
system but the experts who maintain the system as well (Luhmann 1979). Nowadays,
parts of the system are delegated to experts. Experts may also function as ‘facework com-
mitments’ (Giddens 1990). They mediate the interaction of the users and the systems.
They become ‘the face’ of the system; making the system accessible to the user to a
certain extent. However, the control of experts over the system also has its limits. Even com-
puter experts acknowledge that the system sometimes can perform in a way that goes
beyond their understanding (see for example Aupers 2002: who found that computer
experts often experience these systems as autonomous forces). New systems are built
upon old ones, continuous updates are needed and ICT systems always remain ‘under con-
struction’. All in all, this results in a technological knot only few are able to unravel.
7.3. Trust in risk assessment
Finally, trust is also implicitly part of the cybersecurity risk assessments, of the activity
involved in defining which risks exist in cyberspace for a given party, what their probability
and impact may be, and which measures and interventions ought to be taken to reduce
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these risks to ‘acceptable levels’ (whatever we define these to be). Just as trust is a strategy
to reduce complexity, a risk assessment is also a way of reducing complexity. More specifi-
cally, it reduces the complexity of a certain situation or event by translating it in risks and
uncertainties. With risk we refer to an active and explicit engagement with future threats.
When we talk about risks, we talk about the chance or probability that a certain – often
undesirable – event will occur. When we refer to uncertainty, on the other hand, we
face possible unpredictable outcomes (Knight 1921; Keymolen 2016, 69). Here, trust also
implicitly enters the scene, as we have to trust that these unpredictable outcomes will
not hinder our actions. These uncertainties cannot be removed, but only be neutralised.
With trust these possible negative outcomes are moved to the background and the
focus is turned to this one desired future state of affairs. However, risks and uncertainties
cannot always be so easily discerned. So-called systemic risks – risks that are embedded in
larger societal processes (Renn, Klinke, and van Asselt 2011, 235) – are highly complex in
nature, making it more difficult to clearly detect chains of events. Moreover, the ambiguity
surrounding these systemic risks often results in several viewpoints which all seem legit-
imate (Renn, Klinke, and van Asselt 2011, 235). Consequently, these systemic risks cannot
easily be calculated as a function of probability and effects (Renn et al. 2011). In addition,
the world does not only confront us with uncertainty because of the variability and inde-
terminacy of social processes, we are also aware that our knowledge of risk-determinacy,
impact, and causal effect are limited. To put it differently, even when we talk about risks
there is uncertainty because we might have doubts about our own risk perception. We
may be more convinced about some risks than about others. Some authors, therefore,
see uncertainty as an attribute of risk (Van Asselt 2000). To conclude, it becomes clear
that risk assessments cannot eradicate complexity completely. Risk assessments provide
regulators and defenders with models they can use to base their cybersecurity strategies
on, but by default these models are never as rich as the empirical case they represent and
therefore there is always the possibility of missing out on – what later turn out to be –
important aspects. Consequently, while risk assessment is a dominant strategy in cyberse-
curity, it should not be neglected that in fact it functions in an amalgam of interdependent
complexity-reducing strategies, of which trust is an important element.
8. Trust as an explicit part of a cybersecurity strategy
After establishing that trust is not merely a goal of cybersecurity but is also an implicit part
of cybersecurity, we now want to go a step further and see if and how trust can also be an
explicit part of cybersecurity.
That trust can also be an explicit part of security strategies is probably most evident in
cases where security is ‘outsourced’. Especially after 9/11, we witness an increase in what
has been referred to as the introduction of deputy sheriffs (cf. Lahav and Guiraudon 2000;
Torpey 2000). Organisations or people are asked to take on a role as deputy sheriff. They
become the eyes and ears, as authorities cannot be everywhere. For example, when the
public is actively asked to call if they see something suspicious, they become the
deputy sheriffs of the police. Or when different organisations intensify their cooperation
this can lead to the recruitment of professionals for assignments that lay beyond their
initial field of expertise (e.g. in the domain of youth care: cf. Keymolen and Broeders
2013). On a similar note, Garland (2001) speaks of responsibilisation. People who are not
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an actual expert or are not trained in a certain field are nevertheless giving responsibility to
report to the police or other authorities.
Responsibilisation and the introduction of deputy sheriffs can be seen as a trust-based
(cyber)security strategy.3 For example, when governments call upon citizens to report sus-
picious situations, they trust citizens to be aware and react quickly by calling the number
and report what they have seen. This strategy of course is not full-proof (if it was, it would
not be a trust-based strategy). As the trustor, the government is vulnerable by relying on
non-trained, perhaps not really interested citizens, because it might miss crucial infor-
mation. This vulnerability, however, does not necessarily make it a bad strategy.
Perhaps it is simply not possible because of capacity issues or costs involved to have
ears and eyes everywhere and this trust-based approach might then be a good alternative.
The trustor might not receive as much meaningful information as when there would be
professionals on the ground, but still more information than when there would be no
one paying attention.
When focusing on the domain of cybersecurity, we will now look into two examples in
which security is being outsourced and a trust-based approach is being used to underpin
the cybersecurity strategy. First, we will look into security reward programs as initiated by
Google and Facebook. Second, we will look at peer-to-peer flagging of suspicious behav-
iour on the platform of Airbnb.
8.1. Security reward programs
As no software program or hardware device can be 100% full-proof safe, it is absolutely
necessary – from a cybersecurity perspective – to continuously monitor and investigate
the used technologies to discover bugs and weaknesses. As this is a very time-consuming
task that, moreover, can only be carried out by people with sufficient expertise, it is not
always feasible as a company to cover this in-house. Companies such as Facebook and
Google have therefore captured this problem by calling upon the tech community to
help them detect security issues in their services. In return for their efforts, people who
find weaknesses and report them to the companies involved receive a reward.
Several reward programs are created to stimulate savvy people to engage in this secur-
ity quest. Google, for example has installed a Google Vulnerability Reward Program to
stimulate the detection of vulnerabilities in Google-owned websites and bugs in
Google-developed apps and extensions. Rewards may range from $100 for finding infor-
mation leakages to $20.000 for detecting bugs that give direct access to Google servers
(e.g. sandbox escapes).4 Other reward programs Google runs are a patch reward
program, a Chrome reward program, and an Android reward program.5
Facebook has created the Facebook Bug Bounty program,6 which is more or less similar
to Google’s. People who find security issues on Facebook or on another member of the
Facebook imperium, can file a report, which Facebook will then investigate. If the bug is
indeed a security risk the discoverer will be rewarded.
All in all, we can conclude that in the above-described cases, companies are trusting
outsiders to be part of their cybersecurity strategy. On the one hand this makes companies
vulnerable, as they come to depend on these outsiders, who they can (at best) nudge into
participating by promising rewards but who are, in the end, out of their direct control. On
the other hand, this trust-based approach may fill a blank in the cybersecurity strategy of a
200 B. VAN DEN BERG AND E. KEYMOLEN
company, as it would be too time-consuming or costly to keep these matters in their own
hands.
8.2. Peer-to-peer security
Another example of security being outsourced on a trust-based manner is the reporting of
suspicious behaviour of users by other peers. In the shared economy, which is character-
ized by cutting out the middle man and bottom-up regulation (Botsman and Rogers 2010;
Botsman 2012), peer-to-peer security is an important part of the overall platform security.
The most obvious tool that is set in place to ensure peer-to-peer security is the possi-
bility of rating the trustworthiness of other peers. By rating the interactions with other
peers, it becomes clear for the whole community who is a secure partner to deal with
and who is to be trusted less.
Some platforms, such as Airbnb, go a step further and enable their users to ‘flag’ other
people. On any moment in the interaction on Airbnb, users have the possibility to click on
a flag when they believe something is suspicious or inappropriate.7 Airbnb investigates
each flag on a case-by-case basis.
Alternatively, Airbnb could also choose to screen all users of their platform and monitor
every interaction. And although they certainly do have some (technological) security
measures set in place (Chesky 2011; Gannes 2013; Tanz 2014), by relying on their users
to flag suspicious events, they make their users part of their cybersecurity strategies.
Airbnb depends on their users to report fishy situations based on which they then take
action. Controlling every interaction intensively would probably prevent dubious situ-
ations from happening at all, however, it would come at a price of losing freedom (cf. Nis-
senbaum 2001), which is key to the shared economy.
9. Conclusion
This article started from the assessment that cybersecurity is an increasingly important
theme, and that, aside from the technical community, it also increasingly receives atten-
tion from governments as well. Governments in many Western countries are grappling
with ways in which they can impact cybersecurity in a positive way, predominantly
through the use of regulatory interventions. As we have argued in this article, we find it
striking that certain regulatory strategies have gained widespread implementation,
while others have largely been ignored. We have discussed techno-regulation as a
prime example of the former, and trust of the latter. Underneath the reliance on
techno-regulation, we have argued, is a deep-seated – though probably false – assump-
tion that using techno-regulation leads to more control, and more control equals more
cybersecurity. Since the most important threat to cybersecurity comes from intentional,
highly savvy attackers that seek to exploit systems and find vulnerabilities, the use of a
strategy such as techno-regulation in all likelihood has very little effect with respect to
increasing security. After all, these kinds of attackers make it their business to break
into any system, regardless of its design and the values or rules or norms this design pro-
motes. In contrast, techno-regulatory interventions may have negative effects for end
users, because they limit and shape their action space. So while techno-regulatory inter-
ventions may promise more control and more cybersecurity, we suspect that oftentimes
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these benefits will not materialise, while end users pay a price in terms of their freedom to
act.
An overly strong reliance on techno-regulation as the dominant solution for cybersecur-
ity issues might be unwise, therefore, and this is why it makes sense to also turn to other
regulatory strategies. In this article, we have focused on trust as a key candidate. While
trust is currently considered a key goal for cybersecurity, up until this point in time it is
not explicitly considered to be a potential candidate to help improve cybersecurity as
well. We have shown, however, that trust is already a key, albeit implicit, element of
many cybersecurity strategies (both technical and non-technical). We have also shown
that it can be used very effectively as an explicit element of cybersecurity strategies, for
companies and potentially also for governments themselves.
Notes
1. Or businesses or any other party who wishes to increase control over (an element of) cyber-
space. In this article, we focus only on governments. But much of what is said here is appli-
cable to any party seeking to regulate the behaviour of others.
2. It is evident that ‘trustworthiness’ is deemed crucial when one considers to put trust to use as
an explicit regulatory strategy in the cybersecurity domain. Questions such as: ‘which design
choices foster trustworthiness – both on the psychological and technical level?’ or ‘how can
trustworthiness be measured and become a part of risk-assessments?’ then come in to
play. To understand trustworthiness, one has to take a contextual approach and analyse
the intertwining of the different complexity-reducing strategies that are active in a specific
case. For example, a comprehensive legal framework may presort the action of actors enhan-
cing their trustworthiness, consequently lowering the barrier to place trust. However, as this
article focuses on the choices of regulatory strategies and not so much on the implementation
of these strategies, nor takes a contextual approach by delving into a specific case, ‘trust-
worthiness’ unfortunately falls out of its scope.
3. Responsibilisation and the introduction of deputy sheriffs do not necessarily take the shape of a
trust-based strategy. Responsibilisation can also be enforced, for example, by inscribing it in the
system or by holding employers accountable if they do not fulfil their deputy sheriff function.
4. https://www.google.com/about/appsecurity/reward-program/index.html, Accessed 10 July 2016.
5. https://www.google.com/about/appsecurity/programs-home/, Accessed 10 July 2016.
6. https://www.facebook.com/BugBounty/info?tab=page_info, Accessed 10 July 2016.
7. https://www.airbnb.nl/help/article/4/how-does-airbnb-help-build-trust-between-hosts-and-
guests, Accessed 10 July 2016.
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